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DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
JURISDICTION FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS-LEASING
AGREEMENT
Scholnik v. NationalAirlines, Inc.
219 F. 2d 115 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 1955)
Defendant airline operated no flights within Ohio but some of its planes
were flown into Ohio under an Equipment Interchange Leasing Agreement
with Capital Airlines. Through flights to Miami were advertised by CapitalNational and tickets were sold by Capital in Ohio. Plaintiff was injured on
a flight while the plane was over Florida. The court found that the defendant was doing business in Ohio so as to be subject to service of process
there. An agency relationship was said to exist in the solicitation of business for National by Capital. The court refused to follow cases holding
that a state obtained no jurisdiction over connecting railroad carriers.
AVIATION EXCLUSION CLAUSE-DEATH ON COMBAT FLIGHT
HELD COVERED BY INSURANCE
Onze v. PrudentialInsurance Company of America
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,562 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, June 4,
1955)
Insured was killed when his plane was shot down by enemy gunfire over
Korea. His insurance policy had a clause limiting liability of the company
for death as a result of operating or riding in an airplane. There was no
clause excluding the war risk. The aviation exclusion clause was said to be
a "result" clause; that is, death must have been a direct or indirect result
of the flight to be excluded. Only the ordinary risks and perils of aviation
were intended to be excluded and not the deliberate act of a public enemy.
In this case, the insured was killed solely by enemy gunfire and, since this
is a risk associated with war, it is not excluded.
AVIATION EXCLUSION CLAUSE-DROWNING
AFTER FORCED LANDING
McDaniel v. Standard Accident Insurance Co.
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,617 (7th Cir. March 31, 1955)
Deceased's plane made a forced landing 35 yards from shore. Deceased
was not injured by the landing and started to swim toward shore. Although
there were no turbulences in the lake and the deceased was an average
good swimmer, he drowned about 15 feet from shore. In applying the
exclusion clause, the court felt there was no evidence that death resulted
from injuries sustained while in an airplane. Drowning is not a risk
associated with aerial flight in a private plane. The court awarded plaintiff
attorney's fees under a statute authorizing this where an insurance company's refusal to pay a loss is vexatious and without reasonable cause.
FAILURE OF AIR CARRIER TO PROVIDE CONNECTIONSLIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Wittenberg v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
126 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. S. Car. Dec. 7, 1954)
Plaintiff alleged that he sustained damages because defendant's Cleveland-Charlotte flight failed to connect with its Charlotte-Columbia flight.
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He further alleged that defendant's agent assured him that the Cleveland
flight would make the connection and if it were late the Columbia flight would
be held until the Cleveland flight arrived in Charlotte. The Columbia flight
departed ten minutes before the Cleveland flight arrived. When plaintiff
refused to sign an unconditional acceptance for the refund of his ticket,
the refund offer was withdrawn. The court granted a summary judgment
holding that the Tariff Rules and the conditions on the ticket relieving
defendant of liability for changes in scheduling and failure to make connections barred plaintiff's relief. The court also relied on a condition on the
ticket denying the authority of defendant's agents to alter or waive any of
the provisions of the contract. In seeking to avoid these provisions, the
plaintiff alleged a tort, but the court found no tortious conduct on defendant's part and limited plaintiff's recovery to the price of his unused ticket.
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY ON GROUND IN PLANE CRASHPROOF OF INTENT
Margosian v. U.S. Airlines, Inc.
127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1955)
Plaintiff's property was damaged by the crash of defendant's airplane.
The complaint alleged trespass and sought a motion for summary interlocutory judgment. The defendant claimed no trespass occurred because
there was no intent or wilfulness in the damage of plaintiff's property. The
court held that the defendant need not intend the injury; if the harm is an
immediate consequence of defendant's act he will be liable in trespass apart
from his intent. The court went on to say further, in answer to defendant's
argument that the operation of planes is no longer an ultrahazardous
activity, that the greater number of planes, take-offs, and landings indicate
that there is now a more frequent exposure to accidents on the part of
persons and property.
EXPLOSION OF AIR FORCE PLANE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Williams v. United States
218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 1955)
An Air Force jet plane exploded in mid-air causing flaming fuel to
injure the plaintiff who was on the ground. The plaintiff relied solely on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur while' the government refused to call any
witnesses because the national security might be imperiled. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the lower court had mistakenly taken judicial notice of
the experimental work being carried on at the field from which the plane
came and, that even if it were warranted in taking this notice, there was
,nothing to justify the inference that this particular flight was an experimental one. Therefore, there was no basis for the lower court's holding that
this was a discretionary function for which no liability ensues under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. However, after noting the irreconcilable conflict
of opinion in the application of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents, the
court decided that the doctrine was inapplicable here. The plaintiff must do
more than show that the plane was in the exclusive control of the government; he must also show that the accident would not have occurred in the
ordinary course of events if the defendant had exercised due care. Since
there is no knowledge of what would cause a jet airplane to explode in
mid-air and no evidence to show the accident would not occur unless there
were negligence, there was no basis for recovery.
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LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT-INJUNCTION-DAMAGES
Gardner v. County of Allegheny
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,528 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 1955)
Dahlstrom v. United States
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,595 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 1955)
In the Gardner case, plaintiffs sought an injunction preventing planes
from flying at an altitude lower than the floor of the navigable airspace
while landing or taking off at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. Continuous
trespasses and damage to plaintiffs' property were claimed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Federal Government's control of aviation
was based upon the interstate commerce power of Congress and not on a
principle of ownership of the airspace of the country. Further, the power
of Congress is not exclusive; state courts may enjoin flights below the
minimum safe altitude of flights in interstate commerce if the flights constitute a nuisance or endanger a person's life or property. Damages for
the "taking" of land by the low and frequent flights may not be awarded by
an equity court since there is a statute for condemnation preceedings
authorizing specific methods to be used in arriving at an award.
In the Dahlstrom case, a plane flying at an altitude of 100 feet and
piloted by an employee of the Civil Aeronautics Administration frightened
plaintiff's horses causing them to pull a hayrack over plaintiff's leg. The
plane was being used to make a survey of obstacles to an instrument
approach pattern for a nearby airport. The court held that, even though
the acts of the pilot may have violated the state statute or amounted to
negligence, there was no liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
because the duties here fell within the discretionary exception. Flying at
an altitude of 100 feet was necessary to measure the height of obstacles
to the approach system being developed.
NEGLIGENCE OF CONTROL TOWER PERSONNELLIABILITY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
United States v. Union Trust Company
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,546 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 1955)
Air Transport Associates, Inc. v. United States
2 CCH Aviation Law Rep. 17,613 (9th Cir. Mar., 18, 1955)
The Union Trust Company case involved the question of whether the
Federal Government could be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
alleged negligence in the operation of the control tower at the Washington
National Airport which resulted in the collision of two planes. The court
held the United States subject to suit on the theories that nothing prevented
private persons who would be liable in this situation from operating the
control towers; and that the operators were to handle details and therefore
their duties were outside the discretionary function exception, there being
no planning level decisions in regard to traffic at public airports to make.
One of plaintiff's planes in the Air Transport Association case, was
damaged because of negligence in instructing it to land when two unlighted
trucks were on the runway. The plaintiff had an agreement with the United
States to use its military field in Anchorage, Alaska but under the contract
plaintiff had released the government from future liability for negligence.
The court held such an agreement to be invalid if the party seeking to be
released is engaged in public or quasi-public service. The government, in
operating the field for civil as well as military flights, was engaged in a
public service and, therefore, the contract clause was no bar to recovery.

